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n episode of the sitcom Black Books shows a character, 
Fran, starting work at an office.2 The problem is that Fran 
has not been told what the company does, or what she is 
supposed to be doing with her time. Every time she is about to 
ask someone what her job is, she gets worried that she will seem 
incompetent in her new, mysterious role, and be fired. So instead, 
she pretends to know what she is doing. She sits at her computer 
typing out, over and over again, ‘What am I doing here?’ She has 
a conversation with her boss, and instead of asking him to explain 
what work she is expected to do, she panics, and promises to give 
a presentation to the company’s board of managers. When she 
arrives to give her presentation, she surveys the room, and 
delivers a speech.  
 
‘Well, well, well. What am I doing here? What’s it all about? Any 
ideas?’ She draws a circle on the board. ‘Ask yourself: is this a) 
efficient and b) productive?’ She draws a dot in the centre of a 
circle and asks, her voice cracking slightly under the weight of 
her sincerity, ‘Is this the best that we can be?’ She draws an arrow 
leading out of the circle; she underlines the circle; she asks, 
ponderously, ‘Are we or are we not … a company?’ The board of 
directors goes wild. Afterwards, Fran’s boss comes to thank her. 
He tells her that she’s special, that she’s a leader, that she’s going 
to head up her own team. ‘You’re going all the way’, he tells her, 
proudly.  
 
As Maurizio Lazzarato says, “Only idiots … still think that 
responsibility for the ‘degradation’ of language lies with poor 
schoolchildren, immigrants’ sons, the youth, etc., whereas, as 
                                               
1. Many people have shaped and nourished the ideas and arguments in this piece. I 
am grateful for all of them, but especially want to thank those who read and 
commented on earlier versions of this article: Alex Dubilet, Beatrice Marovich, Karen 
Gregory, Eric Daryl Meyer, Anthony Paul Smith, Adam Kotsko and Damien 
Williams. 
2. ‘The Fixer’, Channel 4, 2002. 
A 
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Pasolini already had it in the 1960s, private enterprise and 
marketing are the ones responsible.”3 Lazzarato cites the 
sociological work of Marie-Anne Dujarier, who analyses the use 
of semiotics in the customer service relationship.  She notes that 
the higher up the management hierarchy one climbs, the further 
one gets from the crude material exchange of money for products, 
and the more abstract the language of business becomes, until 
eventually one reaches the dazzling darkness of political 
discourse, in which language all but collapses in upon itself in a 
frenzy of self-referentiality.4  
 
Here we find ourselves lost in the mystical union with the 
unnamable source of surplus value, in which all that is solid melts 
into air; in which, to quote Dionysius the Areopagite’s Mystical 
Theology, “our sightless minds are filled with treasures beyond all 
beauty.”5 Those of us who have spent time in business meetings 
recognise this experience of the dissolution of meaning in the face 
of the transcendent all too well. If theological speech aims at 
abstraction in the hope of coming closer to the unspeakable, 
unknowable being of God, and the language of late capitalism 
moves ever further away from the crude materiality of use value 
and human need in quest of the pure Platonic form of surplus 
value, then I want to hazard that this parallel is not merely 
accidental. I want to wager, in all seriousness, that the 
contemporary form of that old theological question, why does 
God demand our worship?, is the question that Fran asks: what’s 
the point of my job?  
 
To trace the conversion of the one question into the other – of the 
economy of glory to the economy of surplus-value – I will turn 
first to the process of “disenchantment” commonly taken to 
characterise the transition from the enchanted universe of 
medieval Christendom to the rationalised and taxonomised 
cosmos of modern Europe. 
 
Enchantment 
 
It seemed for a while as though the appearance of capitalism 
meant that mystery and mysticism alike were gone from the 
world, or at least doomed to extinction. Charles Taylor’s “secular 
                                               
3. Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity. Translated by 
Joshua David Jordan (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2014), 115-116. 
4. Signs and Machines, 116-117. 
5. In Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, translated by Colm Luibheid (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1987), 134. 
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age” was always also a machine age; the death of God and the 
mechanisation of the world developed in tandem with one 
another. But magic did not disappear from this new world; 
instead, it found itself transposed into new forms, new bodies, 
and new powers.  
 
Recent discussions of technology and digital culture, both 
popular and academic, have taken a curious turn towards 
magical and religious concepts in order to describe the new world 
being networked together with digital tools. From the Haunted 
Machines project which explores “narratives of myth, magic and 
haunting around technology” to Reverend Joey Talley, a Wiccan 
witch who works to make protective charms or expel 
mischievous spirits from computer systems; from political 
theologians who seek to understand the algorithmic circulation 
of money in global computer networks as worship to the theorists 
who have sought to explain devotion to Apple computers as a 
new form of religion: to grapple with the world we inhabit under 
digital capitalism is, more and more, to find oneself caught up in 
the language of magic, religion, and enchantment.6  
 
Recent work in continental philosophy of religion has taken a 
postsecular turn for two reasons: first because, although religion 
never really went away, it is increasingly difficult to deny its 
persistence; and second, because as for all that we might be free, 
as Charles Taylor says, to practice our faith as “one human 
possibility among others”,7 this freedom of “religious” practice 
occurs within a context in which there is no alternative to the 
religion of capitalism.8 We can worship whichever God we want 
as long as we bend the knee to Mammon. Along similar lines, I 
want to trouble the notion that we live in a “disenchanted” world 
for which, such narratives often imply, the appropriate remedy is 
                                               
6. http://hauntedmachines.com [Accessed 18 August 2016]; John Farrier, ‘Silicon 
Valley turns to this Wiccan Witch to Remove Computer Viruses and Demons’ on 
Neatorama, 19 July 2015, http://www.neatorama.com/2015/07/19/Silicon-Valley-
Turns-to-This-Wiccan-Witch-to-Remove-Computer-Viruses-and-Demons/ 
[Accessed 18 August 2016]; Phillip Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion: The Price of 
Piety (London: Routledge, 2002); Pui-Yan Lam, ‘May the Force of the Operating 
System be with You: Macintosh Devotion as Implicit Religion’ in Sociology of Religion 
62.2 (2001), 243-262. 
7. A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 3. 
8. See, for example, Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on 
the Neoliberal Condition, translated by Joshua David Jordan (Cambridge: MIT, 2012); 
Phillip Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion: The Price of Piety (London: Routledge, 
2003); Joshua Ramey, Politics of Divination: Neoliberal Endgame and the Religion of 
Contingency (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016). 
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a process of “re-enchantment”.9 Instead, I will make a case for a 
“post-disenchantment” approach which recognises not only that 
we can no longer evade the persistence of magical thinking and 
practices, but also that the entangling networks which constitute 
contemporary capitalism function as a system of technological re-
enchantment, a secular reiteration of the kinds of structures of 
power and domination which characterised the enchanted 
universe of classical Christian thought.   
 
“At the basis of magic”, Silvia Federici argues, “was an animistic 
conception of nature that did not admit to any separation 
between matter and spirit, and thus imagined the cosmos as a 
living organism, populated by occult forces ... where nature was 
viewed as a universe of signs and signatures, marking invisible 
affinities that had to be deciphered”10. What Federici misses, 
however, is what theologians bemoaning the rise of secularism 
and the loss of Christian hegemony know all too well: that in the 
Christian West this vision of the world was not only that of magic 
but also that of mysticism, of the Christian-Neoplatonic synthesis 
which had prevailed for centuries, in which everything that was 
pointed not only to other things in the world but also to God; in 
which all things were held together by their participation in the 
divine economy of desire, of glory. The enchanted universe of 
European Christendom was a mystical body written through 
with meaning and purpose, its origin and end in the God who 
brought it into being: the cosmos of Augustine, for whom the 
heavens, the living creatures, and the earth alike cried out, “He 
made us”;11 “a world of spirits, demons, and moral forces”.12 Of 
course, the moral forces at work in this enchanted world were no 
more straightforwardly benign than the spirits understood to 
populate it. The Christian metaphysics of participation meant 
that everything was meaningful and purposive but also 
established clear hierarchies of power: of class, gender, and the 
distinctions between Christianity and its others, which was 
eventually to become race. Everything was made by and destined 
for God; and yet some had more capacity for participation in 
                                               
9. See, for example, Tracy Fessenden’s discussion of post-secular work which 
appeals ‘to the power of mysticism, magic, adrenaline, religious sampling, and self-
help to recharge and rename secular emptiness as postsecular fullness, 
disenchantment as reenchantment’ (Fessenden, ‘The Problem of the Postsecular’ in 
American Literary History 26.1, 163). 
10.  Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (New York: 
Autonomedia, 2004)), 141-142. 
11. Confessions. Translated by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 183. 
12. Secular Age, 26. 
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divine being than others. As Dionysius has it, some created things 
“share completely in the Good, others participate in it more or 
less, others have a slight portion only, and, to others, again, the 
Good is but a far-off echo ... this has to be so, for otherwise the 
most honoured, the most divine things would be on the order 
with the lowliest.”13  
 
Disenchantment 
 
The transition from feudalism to early industrial capitalism was 
marked by the enclosure not only of common land but also of 
individual bodies from the world in which they lived and of the 
world itself from God. As the world was disenchanted, so too 
were the elements of human life and work divided and separated 
from one another in the school, the home, the factory and the 
prison.14  In place of the world as mystical body – animated by 
the endless desire of God, driven to transcend itself in pursuit of 
the beatific vision – emerged a new vision of the body as a 
machine, as “clock-like matter” – animated by the insatiable 
desire of the capitalist, driven to overcome the limitations 
imposed by the rising and setting of the sun or the weakness of 
the limbs, in pursuit of surplus value.15  
 
But emergence of this secular machine era of distinction and 
division was not just important for its impact on the social role of 
magic and religion: it marked also a number of crucial shifts in 
the configuration of class and gender, and the inscription of the 
new distinctions of race onto human flesh.  
 
The new centrality of the figure of the individual to the project of 
modernity is ultimately inseparable from the new class mobility, 
which emerged along with the fragmentation of Christian Europe 
along denominational lines. No longer was the world divided 
merely into Christian and non-Christian; and no longer was 
Christendom divided merely into those who work, those who 
fight and those who pray. The process of “disenchantment” was 
also the process by which peasant land was enclosed; by which 
the traditional bonds of charity and care for the poor were 
dissolved; by which a new middle class emerged, freed from the 
imperative to care for the salvation of others and driven instead 
by the Protestant work ethic, by the notion that what marked one 
                                               
13. ‘The Divine Names’ in The Complete Works, 86. 
14. See, for example, Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch; Michel Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin, 1991. 
15. Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 140. 
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out as predestined for salvation was the accumulation not of good 
deeds but of wealth.16 
 
Likewise, as public and private life were newly marked out as 
separate from one another, and religion was pushed ever more 
into the private realms of the home and the interior life of the 
individual, so too did new gendered divisions of labour emerge 
along these lines; women increasingly relegated to the home, and 
to the unwaged work of reproductive labour.17 
 
Finally, the emergence of these new categories of religion and the 
secular meant not only the new intensification of the distinction 
between Western Christians and their religious and geographical 
others but the racialisation of this distinction. As the distinction 
between Christians, Jews and Muslims came to be understood not 
merely in terms of belief but as a difference “between bloods”, 
between different types of being, this in turn enabled the 
emergence of new distinctions: between colonisers and colonised; 
between human beings and slaves.18 Colonialism and the 
transatlantic slave trade carved new lines of distinction and 
demarcation around the globe; the secularisation of space 
inseparable from the processes of spatial disruption by which the 
identities of colonised and enslaved peoples were, as Willie 
Jennings describes, uprooted from the “narratives of the 
collective self that bound identity to geography, to earth, to water, 
to trees and animals” and placed instead within the logics of 
“possession of, not possession by”, land, and by a hierarchical 
scale which placed all beings in relation not to God but to 
whiteness.19 
 
Re-enchantment 
 
Yet with this newly divided and mechanised society came also, 
with time, the shift from tools to machines; the shift from the 
workshop to the factory to the global network; from a society of 
                                               
16. See, for example, Federici, Caliban and the Witch; Keith Thomas, Religion and the 
Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century England 
(London: Penguin, 2003); Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(Createspace, 2013). 
17. See, for example, Federici, Caliban and the Witch; Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender and 
Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
18. Gil Anidjar, Blood: A Critique of Christianity (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2014), 135; see also George Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002). 
19. Willie James Jennings, The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 59. 
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sovereignty, to a disciplinary society, to a society of control; the 
shift from accumulation to circulation.20 What we see in post-
Fordist economies, I want to suggest, is a late-capitalist re-
invention of the kind of mystical universe inhabited by Dionysius 
the Areopagite, marked by three key characteristics: the re-
enchantment of the world, the re-constitution of an erotic 
economy, and the return of the soul to the centre of the problem 
of work. Drawing on the work of Maurizio Lazzarato, Frédéric 
Lordon, and Franco Berardi, I will explore some of the key 
contours of this secular return of the kind of theological economy 
of the created world found in classical Christian thought, before 
turning to the ambiguous figures of the angel and the cyborg to 
explore further the questions of work, government and liberation 
in the era of technological re-enchantment. This new constitution 
of the world marks not the disappearance of class, gender and 
race, but their transformation; not the end of struggles over work, 
power and freedom but their reconfiguration. 
 
In Signs and Machines, Maurizio Lazzarato argues that what 
characterises this late stage of capitalism is a shift from an 
economic model in which the process of production is controlled 
by the sovereign individual subject, and therefore by language, 
to a machinic form of capitalism in which the individual human 
being is transformed into a mere component of larger processes 
of production and valorisation, which are driven less by language 
and human intent than by functional and operational processes.  
 
Where disenchantment was marked by the emergence of the 
Enlightenment individual – the exemplary white, wealthy man 
declaring the death of God even as he usurped his role as 
sovereign ruler of the world – the growing autonomy of the 
circulation of capital has meant the slow unsettling of this model 
of selfhood. While individuals under this late form of capitalism 
continue to conceive of themselves as rational, sovereign subjects, 
in control of themselves as human capital, the processes of 
production function increasingly independently of human 
intention, according to the “asignifying semiotics” of stock 
market indices, mathematical equations and diagrams which “do 
not involve consciousness and representations and do not have 
the subject as referent.”21 Lazzarato argues that this shift 
represents the return of two archaic forms. First is Lewis 
Mumford’s “megamachine – the Egypt of the pyramids” 
                                               
20. Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ in October 59 (1992), 3-7. 
21. Signs and Machines, 39. 
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(discussed in greater detail later in this paper) within which, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, “human beings themselves 
are constituent pieces of a machine they compose among 
themselves and with other things (animals, tools), under the 
control and direction of a higher unity.”22 Second is the animism 
of pre-capitalist societies which, Lazzarato says, is first destroyed 
by capitalism’s objectivation and rationalization of nature so as to 
make the world more easily exploitable and then restored by the 
capitalist emergence of a “machinic animism”.23  
 
This shift from objectivation and rationalization to the emergence 
of new animisms is made flesh by the changing logics of 
racialisation – from the explicit classifications of colonial control 
and the stark divisions of Jim Crow laws to the more occult 
workings of racecraft which characterise our present “post-
racial” era.24 In her essay, “Why are the Digital Humanities So 
White? or Thinking the Histories of Race and Computation”, Tara 
McPherson argues that it is no coincidence that the values driving 
UNIX computing systems - especially the principles of 
information hiding and compartmentalising - are also those of 
post-Fordism. If, she says, “the first half of the twentieth century 
laid bare its racial logics, from ‘Whites Only’ signage to the 
brutalities of lynching, the second half increasingly hides its racial 
‘kernel’, burying it below a shell of neoliberal pluralism.”25 
Racism comes to have a double function, then, in this new, 
technologically enchanted universe we inhabit: as both a way of 
shoring up the conservative identity politics of nation and race to 
which individuals turn in the face of the neoliberal undermining 
of social relations, and as the hidden kernel of the algorithmic 
processes which determine more and more the distribution of 
social relations: wealth, policing, surveillance.26  
 
A second characteristic of the process of disenchantment was the 
transformation of a world understood to be driven by the desire 
of God into a regularised and rational machine driven not by 
                                               
22. Signs and Machines, 32. 
23. Signs and Machines, 134.  
24. Karen E. Fields and Barbara J. Fields, Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American 
Life (New York: Verso, 2012), 65. Drawing on E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s landmark study 
(Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), Fields and Fields argue that both magic and race ‘are products of thought, and 
of language’. 
25. In Debates in the Digital Humanities, edited by Matthew K. Gold (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 148. 
26. See, for example, R. Joshua Scannell, ‘What can an Algorithm Do?’ in DIS 
Magazine, http://dismagazine.com/discussion/72975/josh-scannell-what-can-an-
algorithm-do/ [Accessed 19 August 2016]. 
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inherent meaning and purpose but by the will to power of human 
beings. In his Willing Slaves of Capital, Frédéric Lordon argues that 
capitalism must “be grasped not only in its structures but also as 
a certain regime of desire.”27 Where earlier forms of capitalism 
could rely on the motivating power of the desire to avoid the 
unhappiness that comes with unemployment and penury, late 
capitalism requires a more total enlistment of individuals in 
pursuit of its goals. The worst of this capitalist enlistment of 
desire is visible, Lordon argues, in the service sector which, “not 
only commands employees to show the required emotions … but 
aims at the ultimate behavioural performance in which the 
prescribed emotions are no longer merely outwardly enacted, but 
‘authentically’ felt.”28 Lordon notes the similarity between this 
newly totalitarian demand and the shift which took place within 
confessional practices in the 17th century church from an 
insistence on correct behaviour to the demand for the right 
“’internal’ disposition.”29 But it is no coincidence that this shift 
occurred simultaneously with the growing privatization and 
feminization of religion, its relegation from the sphere of public 
life and political power to the sphere of private life and social 
reproduction, to the realm of housework in which, as Silvia 
Federici says, “Men are able to accept our services and take 
pleasure in them” because we do it for love. 30 If the rise of 
emotional labour in the sphere of paid work tracks the gradual 
feminization of labour then this is less the result of feminist 
demands for “wages for housework”, and more a result of the 
neoliberal encroachment of the profit motive into every area of 
human life and the impossibility of – yet – automating the 
production of social capital. What drives employees today is not 
only the negative desire to escape suffering - to get paid - but also 
the positive desire to attain the joy of recognition – a joy which is, 
however, distributed by way of a hierarchy in which, Lordon 
says, “the immense joy coming from the outside in the form of 
public recognition falls to [the bosses] first”, subsequently to be 
passed down “along the hierarchical chains that are the gutters of 
a trickle-down economy of joy.”31  
                                               
27. Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire. Translated by Gabriel Ash 
(London: Verso 2014), ebook version. 
28. Willing Slaves of Capital, ebook. 
29. Willing Slaves of Capital, ebook. 
30. ‘Wages Against Housework (1975)’ in Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, 
Reproduction and Feminist Struggle (New York: PM Press, 2012), 21. 
31. Willing Slaves of Capital, ebook, italics original. Cf Dionysius’ ‘Celestial 
Hierarchy’: ‘The goal of a hierarchy, then, is to enable beings to be as like as possible 
to God … it ensures that when its members have received [divine illumination’ they 
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Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi’s Soul at Work argues that, while the early 
stages of capitalism required an alienation of the worker from her 
body precisely so that she could be induced to view it as property 
to be sold,32 the growing importance of cognitive capitalism, 
service work, and affective labour to the contemporary economy 
represent a new form of alienation in which the soul itself is put 
to work. We go to work not only to earn a salary, but to work on 
ourselves, to work on our souls. What emerges from this new 
regime of holistic alienation is a new “virtual class” who have 
liberated themselves from the constraints of their physical bodies; 
who are “physically removed from other human beings (whose 
existence becomes a factor of insecurity), though ubiquitous, 
virtually present in any possible place according to their 
desires.”33   Berardi says that “the removal of corporeality is a 
guarantee of endless happiness” for these privileged few, “but 
naturally a frigid and false one, because it ignores, or rather 
removes, corporeality.”34 And just as the disembodied 
contemplative life of the elite spiritual class of monastic men in 
medieval Christian Europe was made possible by the hard 
manual labour of those living the less elevated active life, so too 
is the charmed life of tech billionaires enabled by the badly-paid, 
back-breaking drudgery of Silicon Valley cafeteria workers, 
content moderators in the Philippines, click farmers in 
Bangladesh and MMORPG gold farmers in China.35  
 
Heavenly Machines 
 
I want to argue that these three transformations within capitalism 
– the machinic re-enchantment of the world, the emergence of an 
                                               
can then pass on this light generously … to beings further down the scale’ (The 
Complete Works, 153). 
32. See, for example, Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 135. 
33. Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy. Translated by Francesca Cadel and 
Giuseppina Mecchia (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009). This mode of elite locomotion 
is curiously like that of the angels, at least according to Aquinas: unconstrained by 
bodies, an angel ‘is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic 
power’: that is, simply by will or desire (Summa Theologiae, I.52.1, New Advent 
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1052.htm [Accessed 17 August 2016]. 
34 Soul at Work, 104. 
35. See, for example, Julia Carrie Wong, ‘Silicon Valley’s poorest workers tell 
government “we can’t live like this”’ in The Guardian, 28 January 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/28/silicon-valley-service-
workers-poor-intel-tech-facebook [Accessed 19 August 2016]; Mayukh Sen, ‘The 
Bengali Click Farmer’ in The New Inquiry, 27 June 2016, 
http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-bengali-click-farmer/ [Accessed 19 August 
2016]; Daniel Greene and Daniel Joseph, ‘The Digital Spatial Fix’ in tripleC: 
Communication, Capitalism and Critique 13.2 (2015), 223-247. 
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erotic economy, and the enlistment of the soul into contemporary 
regimes of work – might be read as a digital and machinic re-
constitution of the cosmos of Christian-Neoplatonism, and 
specifically to draw attention to the resemblance of these three 
features to the erotic, hierarchical economy found in the work of 
Dionysius the Areopagite. What this comparison makes clear is 
not only the ways in which the contemporary world is like the 
enchanted universe of pre-capitalist Christendom, but also the 
ways in which the enchanted universe was like the machinic 
structures of the contemporary world. I want to argue that the 
figure of the angel in classical theology is, in certain crucial 
respects, isomorphic with the figure of the cyborg for 
contemporary culture; that cyborgs are kin to angels but also, 
crucially, that angels were always-already cyborgs. 
 
The first Christian theologian to offer a properly systematic 
angelology was Dionysius the Areopagite, whose Celestial 
Hierarchy sets out the rigidly structured and hierarchical 
organisation of angelic beings and activity alongside his 
Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, which sets out the rigidly structured and 
hierarchical organisation of churchly ranks and activities. For 
Dionysius, the created world is a divine economy, a heavenly 
machine which exists to facilitate the circulation of divine eros. 
The desire of God emanates from the divine being, and is passed 
down from the highest heights of the most perfect angels to the 
lowest depths of the most fallen human beings, and thence back 
again: the light of God which illuminates the world is returned 
back to the divine in the form of worship.  
 
As Giorgio Agamben argues, within this vision of the created 
order the function of the angelic beings is essentially that of a 
bureaucracy. The angels mediate between the single divine 
source of all being and power and the multiplicity of the world, 
transmitting without error the divine commands and managing 
the world on God’s behalf; and transmitting upwards the tribute 
due to the ruler of all things: not taxes, but worship.36 It is no 
coincidence, Agamben argues, that in the history of the West the 
two systems, angelology and bureaucracy, emerge and develop 
in tandem with one another. “Angelology is”, he argues, “the 
most ancient, articulated and detailed reflection on that particular 
                                               
36. ‘Angelology and Bureaucracy’ in The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological 
Genealogy of Economy and Government. Translated by Lorenzo Chiesa (with Matteo 
Mandarini) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 144-164. 
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form of power or divine action which we could call the 
‘government of the world.’”37 
 
On Agamben’s reading, the role of the angels in Dionysius’ 
celestial hierarchy consists of two aspects of the single core 
function of the transmission of sacred power or glory: the 
hierarchical management of the created order, and the liturgical 
generation of praise. The problem for this paradigm of 
government is that the government of the angels lasts only as 
long as creation remains unredeemed; once the final 
consummation of history arrives then not only the angels but God 
himself are left with nothing to govern. Glory, Agamben says “is 
what must cover with its splendor the unaccountable figure of 
divine inoperativity”; the angels continue to function as conduits 
for the circulation of divine light and yet, unmediated as this 
circulation now is by the dark and heavy matter of the world, 
their hymns of praise become all but indistinguishable from the 
divine being itself.38 The perfect adoration of God is best 
expressed in the silence of a mystical union that is all but 
indistinguishable from death.  
 
As Lazzarato points out, this hierarchical structure, radiating 
outwards from the divine summit, brings to mind the social 
organisation which the philosopher of technology Lewis 
Mumford describes as “the archetypal machine … the earliest 
working model for all later complex machines.”39 Mumford 
describes the invention of the megamachine: an invisible 
structure composed of hundreds upon thousands of individual 
human beings; all working in concert as the result of a highly 
disciplined and bureaucratic division of labour; all held together 
by the unifying figure of the divine ruler, the king. It was the 
emergence of these megamachines which made possible the 
construction of the Great Pyramids, and their emergence 
signified the coming into being of a model of society so 
profoundly important for human history that it continues to 
shape the world we inhabit today. Mumford draws for his 
analysis on Franz Reuleaux’s definition of a machine as 
consisting of “resistant parts, each specialized in function, 
operating under human control, to utilize energy and to perform 
                                               
37. ‘Angels’, translated by Lorenzo Chiesa, in Angelaki 16.3 (2011), 118 
38. ‘Angelology and Bureaucracy’, 163. 
39. The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development (New York: Harcourt 
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work.”40 But it is Karl Marx’s definition that is more precise and 
illuminating here.  
 
For Marx, a machine (as distinct from a tool) is made up of three 
components: a “motor mechanism”, a self-moving mover which 
drives the machine as a whole; a “transmitting mechanism” 
which “divides and distributes” this power; and “the tool or 
working machine” which fulfils the ultimate goal of the machine: 
the production of surplus-value.41 In the context of this machine, 
Marx says, the deficiencies of individual workers become 
perfections, caught up into the broader purpose of the whole. It 
does not matter if you have rickets, as long as you can perform 
the specialist function you have within the workings of the 
factory. If you are too small to operate the looms you might be 
just the right size to sneak between the machinery when it gets 
stuck. But at the same time, the frailty of the individual human 
body becomes the greatest impediment to the smooth functioning 
of the machine, which tends to push back against these points of 
bodily resistance to the perpetual generation of value. The best 
way for a factory owner to get back their investment in the 
machinery is to run it for as much of the day as possible, and so 
the working day tends to extend itself without regard for the 
human need for food, rest, or sleep. When a person uses a tool, 
Marx says, it is they who put the tool to work: they decide how 
and when the tool should move; they decide when to start work 
and when to stop. But a machine is something which uses 
workers, which puts them to work: “in handicrafts and 
manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the 
machine makes use of him.”42 
 
What I am suggesting, then, is that we might read Dionysius’ 
tripartite account of God, the angels, and the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy as the description of a cosmic machine designed, as 
Agamben suggests, for the government of the world and the 
generation of surplus value in the form of doxology.  
 
The divine eros that generates the Dionysian cosmos originates 
with God, the unmoved mover. It is transmitted by the angels 
who divide and distribute the divine power to the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy, whose members labour, Dionysius says, to become 
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41. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume One. Translated by Ben Fowkes 
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fellow workers with God.43 To labour in this mystical machine is 
to see oneself not as a sovereign individual but as a member of 
the total hierarchy of the created world in which even such 
imperfect beings as women can contribute to the functioning of 
the whole. It is to seek to become “clear and spotless mirrors” 
reflecting the divine light, to overcome as much as possible the 
limitations of our imperfect bodies and become like the seraphim, 
in perpetual motion around the source of all things, moving not 
with the clumsy motion of an earth-bound creature but with the 
pure geometrical motion of the angels whose straight lines and 
perfect circles generate praise in “a movement which never falters 
and never fails.”44 “Nothing is perfect of itself”, Dionysius says, 
we are at best fragments of a larger whole. And yet at the same 
time “nothing is completely free of the need for perfection.” All 
of us can and should strive with all our being to become, as Fran 
suggested to her board of directors, more efficient and 
productive, more perfect conduits of the divine light, the surplus 
value which drives the economy of the created world, to align our 
desire more perfectly with the movement of the whole, with the 
desire of God.45 Are we or are we not a company? 
 
Angels and Cyborgs 
 
Given the processes of disenchantment and the privatisation of 
religion which accompanied the emergence of a new machine age 
in Western modernity, it is not surprising that angels have largely 
disappeared from political theology, stripped of their 
bureaucratic powers and relegated instead to the private realm of 
religious experience; nor is it a coincidence that they begin to 
appear more and more frequently in popular depictions as 
women and children. But nor then should it surprise us that a 
new figure of perfected humanity has come to take their place: 
this, I want to suggest, is one of the reasons for the rise of the 
figure of the cyborg in popular culture. Like the angels, cyborgs 
function as a site for the exploration of questions about the role of 
human beings within larger systems, structures and machines; 
they function as figures for government, for management and 
bureaucracy; they function as figures of perfected workers, 
unconstrained by the limitations of frail human bodies; and they 
function both as speculative figures for imagining human life 
                                               
43. ‘The Celestial Hierarchy’ in The Complete Works, 153. 
44. ‘The Celestial Hierarchy’ 153, 161. 
45. ‘The Celestial Hierarchy’, 173. 
Rose: Machines of Loving Grace  
 
 
JCRT 16.2 (2017) 
254 
lived otherwise and also as tools for making sense of human life 
as it currently exists. 
 
I want to spend the rest of this paper exploring the homologies 
between the figure of the angel, particularly in the work of 
Dionysius the Areopagite and his readers, and the figure of the 
cyborg, particularly in the work of Donna Haraway, the 
philosopher of technology most famous for her “Manifesto for 
Cyborgs”, which takes up the cyborg as a figure for imagining the 
future of socialist feminism.46 Where Dionysius’ angelic 
hierarchy functions as the mediator between God and the rest of 
the created order, as the model for both the power structures of 
the existing order and a vision of embodied life lived radically 
otherwise, Haraway seeks to rescue the figure of the cyborg from 
the nightmarish machinic “colonization of work” and the 
technological “orgy” of war, proposing instead the cyborg as an 
“ironic political myth”, woven together from the materials of 
feminism, socialism and materialism.47  
 
Within the classical Christian vision of the cosmos as a machine 
for the circulation of glory and the late capitalist emergence of a 
society in which everything that exists comes to be seen as part of 
a machine for the generation of surplus value, the figures of the 
angel and the cyborg come to stand both for bureaucracy and 
revolution, for the inscription of hierarchical distinctions and 
their transgression; for the perfect worker and the absolute rebel. 
 
First, then, as I’ve already mentioned, Giorgio Agamben has 
traced the interconnected histories of angels and bureaucrats, 
both functionaries of power who work for the transmission of the 
sacred power of glory, deputy managers of the earthly economy 
over which they preside, tasked with the extraction of glory from 
its subjects. Both orders are imperiled by the end of history, which 
threatens to leave them unemployed: what happens to the 
managers of the world when once it has been made perfect? Both 
angels and bureaucrats, however, find justification for their 
continued existence in immaterial labour: perpetual praise of God 
for the angels; the collection of taxes and sycophantic fawning for 
the bureaucrats of the ancient world, circling endlessly around 
the figure of the king; and the endless proliferation of big data 
analysis for the cyborg bureaucrats of “post-political” late 
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capitalism. And yet, as Anthony Paul Smith argues, angels 
function not only to mediate the relationship of God and the 
world but also as signs of the absolute disjunction between these 
two, as the “negative name for something that is not Worldly”, as 
“a field of battle where one either becomes a domesticated, 
pacified bureaucrat of the way things are or where one separates 
and divides what is from what could be.”48 Angelology was, for 
example, a crucial field on which the Spiritual Franciscans battled 
the bureaucratic power of the Papacy; for them Francis himself, 
“with his disregard for material wealth, for organized work and 
the sexual body” had become “an Angel of the Apocalypse”, a 
herald of a radical break with the existing order of things, a 
fundamental challenge to the institutions of the Church.49 
 
Likewise for Haraway, the possibility of a cyborg world holds out 
before us two very different visions of the future of humanity. On 
the one hand, a cyborg world might mean “the final imposition 
of a grid of control on the planet … the final abstraction embodied 
in a Star War apocalypse”, the quest for machines made of 
sunshine, “light and clean because they are nothing but 
signals.”50 Technology might transform us into the perfect 
workers long fantasised about by employers: untiring, perfectly 
efficient, offering no resistance to the circulation and valorisation 
of capital. But on the other hand, the cyborg world might mean 
instead the vision depicted by so much science fiction: the rising 
up of those enslaved within the machinic functioning of the 
world against their masters; the resolute attempt of those 
subjected by the bureaucratic order of the powers that be to, as 
Haraway puts it, “seize the tools to mark the world that marked 
them as other.”51  
 
Secondly, as functionaries of the divine economy, the angels 
labour, to perpetuate the hierarchies by which power and value 
are distributed, the trickle-down economy of joy. Dionysius’ 
invention of the discipline of systematic angelology was of a piece 
with his invention of the notion of hierarchy: his key contribution 
to Christian discourse on angels was the division of the angels 
into separate kinds, the rigid demarcation of their names, ranks 
and function. These principles of separation and vertical ordering 
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recur in Dionysius’ Ecclesiastical Hierarchy and throughout his 
work, in which the position of a person within the hierarchy of 
the church corresponds precisely to their degree of holiness and 
authority such that no one further down the hierarchy may 
dream of speaking up against those above them.52  
 
Yet just as the machine comes not only to position the individual 
labourer but to push at the boundaries of her being, extend the 
limits of her capacity, so too the positioning of humankind a little 
lower than the angels represents not only the subjection of human 
bodies but the promise of moving beyond them, of transgressing 
the boundaries between human and animal, animal and machine, 
physical and non-physical.53 For Dionysius the progression of 
human sanctification is precisely away from division and 
towards perfect unity with the source of all being; the return of 
all things to their source, in which the differences between body 
and spirit, human and angel, oneness and threeness lose their 
meaning.  
 
This double movement of separation and division likewise 
characterises contemporary discourses concerning the 
boundaries between human, animal and machine. As Haraway 
says, “my cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, potent 
fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people 
might explore as one part of needed political work.”54 Dionysius 
says that we must name God with the names which are most 
inappropriate to the divine nature so that we can more clearly 
grasp the crude inadequacy of all of our attempts to name what 
is highest; Haraway offers as the figure for a feminist socialism 
the coalition named “’Women of color’, a name contested at its 
origins by those whom it would incorporate.”55 Jasbir Puar 
suggests that a further intensification of Haraway’s transgressive 
cyborg vision is necessary, arguing that even Haraway’s cyborg 
hybridity is insufficiently transgressive, leaving intact the 
categories of nature and culture precisely as it recognises their 
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intermeshing in the figure of the cyborg.56 We have never been 
natural; we have never not been machine; we have always been 
cyborgs. 
 
Thirdly, the figure of the angel is the figure of the perfect worker: 
utterly obedient, totally efficient, offering no resistance to the 
smooth circulation of value; just as the function of the  “classic 
bureaucracy” of Mumford’s ancient megamachine is “to pass on, 
without alteration or deviation the orders that come from above” 
- and it is worth noting here that Mumford acknowledges that 
new technology of writing was crucial to this process of untainted 
transmission.57 But on the other hand, in Dionysius’ work to 
become more like the angels – to ascend the mountain of sacred 
power – is an apophatic task in which we must begin to trouble 
the smooth circulation of theological language, to confront the 
breakdown of speech in the face of the source of all value. It is to 
insist, like Haraway’s cyborg politics, “on noise”, to “advocate 
pollution, rejoicing in the illegitimate fusions of animal and 
machine”, the multiplication of inappropriate names for God, to 
say that God is not only goodness and beauty but angry and 
drunk; to say that God is neither angry nor “drunk”, neither 
“good” nor beautiful.58 To reject these names is, within 
Dionysius’ schema, to reject the names that God has handed 
down in scripture; it is to reject our inscription into a particular 
place within the created hierarchy. To desire perfect union with 
God is dangerously close to rebellion: was it not for this that the 
angels were cast out of heaven? 
 
Conclusion 
 
What I have tried to suggest, then, is twofold. First, that recent 
transformations within capitalism – the machinic re-enchantment 
of the world, the emergence of an erotic economy, and the 
enlistment of the soul into contemporary regimes of work – might 
be read as being, in crucial ways, isomorphic with the enchanted 
cosmos of Christian-Neoplatonism. Second, that this “return” of 
enchantment is not a straightforward good, any more than was 
the process of disenchantment which meant both the end of 
feudalism and also the intensely violent rise of capitalist forms of 
exploitation. What it does mean is a curious new position for 
Christian theology. If Christianity really is, as Marx argues and I 
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have suggested here, “the special religion of capital”; 59 if “all 
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state” are, as Carl 
Schmitt suggests, “secularized theological concepts”,60 then we 
are left with two choices. One is to argue, as some have done, that 
the transformations of theological concepts which have given rise 
to the existing order of things indicate the need to return to the 
origin and seek to re-establish Christian hegemony, to re-enchant 
the world. The other is to recognise that if, as Silvia Federici 
argues, “capitalism, as a social-economic system is necessarily 
committed to racism and sexism for it must justify and mystify 
the contradictions built into its social relations … by denigrating 
the ‘nature’ of those it exploits”, then it took those tricks from 
Christianity. We cannot go back, for angels bar our way.61  
 
Both the cyborg and the angel present us with a choice, then: 
either our own re-inscription into the order of things, the pursuit 
of ever more efficient work in the service of the source of all value, 
or the refusal of the hierarchical order of the world as it is and the 
transgressive quest for a radically different world. It is important 
here not to overstate the difference between God and Mammon – 
as Lewis Mumford says, the social machine’s prime mover, 
whether king, priest or plutocrat has always sought to bring the 
two together into a single person.62 We might think here of former 
British prime minister David Cameron, whose 2016 Easter 
message extolled the “Christian values” of “responsibility, hard 
work, charity, compassion and pride in … honouring our social 
obligations.” 63 Perhaps, after all, this new machine age would 
never have been possible in the first place if it were not for the 
Protestant work ethic.  
 
Even if we are, as I have been suggesting, all already cyborgs, 
already cogs in larger machinic organisations, perhaps the 
question we should be asking about our future humanity is not 
when, if ever, we will cease to be human and be transformed into 
something else - an angel of the Lord or something darker and 
more monstrous. As Jasbir Puar points out, the choice Haraway 
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offers – would I rather be a cyborg or a goddess – is a false one, 
but this is not to say there is no choice to be made, no side to 
pick.64 Instead, we might ask ourselves: which God demands our 
worship and why? What value are we creating, and for whom? 
What is, after all, the point of my job? Machines can be stopped; 
they can be hacked; they can be smashed; they can be taken apart 
and put together, differently. What kind of human-machine do 
we want to be part of in our future, which is always already 
arriving? 
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